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Abstract 
This announcement focuses on the concept of crises and thus, financial crisis and how it shapes today’s European society. Our 
starting point in order to understand and analyze today’s reality, which is dominated by a financial and social crisis, is the 
concept of risk as initially defined by Niklas Luhmann and later on by Ulrich Beck. This society is governed by the non-
knowledge of the crisis’ deeper causes, on which we find the possibility of a hazard and destruction, a possibility based on the 
lack of direction.  
In this framework, we investigate the essence of democracy, the existence of power (in particular, power accumulation) and 
how it is combined with the concept of responsibility for the future of Europe and the rhetoric breakdown of Europe, deriving 
from the political attitude of indecisiveness. Sociology is the science, which should provide answers to all the above questions.  
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the 3rd International Conference on Integrated Information. 
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1. Introduction 
The current article’s research focuses on the concept of hazard and its significance in periods of crisis. In 
antiquity, the term “hazard” is not present as a complete concept. It is found for the first time during the transitional 
period from the Middle Ages to the early modern era. Luhmann calls modern society a society of hazard, given that 
the concepts of disorder, destruction and chaos manifest. In this article we shall attempt to consider how the 
concepts of crisis and hazard structurally affect the attempted formation of the European society.  
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decision 
2.  Crisis Definition 
The concept of hazard is used as a thinking concept of a way-out from the social requirements of the said crises. 
The term “crisis” has Greek origins and is defined as intersection, resolution and criticism, decision, stating the 
climax of a difficult and often threatening development of society. Crisis is directly related to people’s perception, 
more than any other historical category. Crises are not pre-existent in society and discovered at certain periods, but 
are created in observation structures, with which modern economists and politics analysts attempt to understand 
and explain complex society structures. Observations themselves become crises. (Föllmer, Moritz, Graf Rüdiger 
2005) The awareness of crisis is grown when the explanation of events cannot reach a logical conclusion. This is 
due to the following ambivalence: Crisis requires an explanation (explanandum), but it also explains historical 
developments of society (explanans). 
In order to explain and thus manage crisis, a critical potential must be created and established, not to deny 
society exposed to crisis, but to analyze crisis, reaching the other side of a normal, usual situation. One needs to be 
able to discern the conditions framing a crisis via observation, defined by Luhmann as differentiation – an 
intersection, a resolution of society’s normal form, registered as a coincidence, since it had not been predicted. 
Antonio Gramsci (1991) similarly describes crisis as the moment when the old world order is dying and when we 
need to assert and conquer a new conflicting world, with oppositions and contradictions. Carl Schmitt also 
suggests an exceptional situation deviating from the normal, usual status.  
3.  Crisis and Time 
The concept of observation, which is a basic means of explaining social phenomena, and thus crisis, for the 
systemic theory, leads us to another significant aspect, the aspect of time. We understand crisis in the framework of 
different “before’s” and “after’s”. We observe crisis not as a single event, but as a difference placing “before” in 
the long past and “after” in the long future. This makes the present rather complex. In other words: The present, 
“now” is the observer’s standing point, observing time with the difference of “before” and “after”, displacing the 
present to an excluded third aspect. The present embodies time’s inability of prediction, what the observer cannot 
see or observe. It is the blind point (blinder Fleck) of observation, and thus the “everywhere and nowhere” 
(Luhmann, Niklas 1991) in the fabric of time.   
Crisis is the intense resolution between the past and the future. It shrinks the present to a determinate time, a 
rather limited time, which is required to link the past to the future. In order to have an orderly implemented time 
continuum, we need to transcend to the required decision, a term characterizing the essence of crisis:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Temporal presentation of the crisis 
The transition from the past to the future takes the form of a decision, which is hazardous before the different 
past and the uncertain future and constitutes a risk. Hazard describes a problematic form of future observation, a 
problematic handling of the future. This problematic character is due to the co-existence of two factors, one 
regarding time itself and the other society:  
 
 
317 Anastasia J. Chournazidis /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  148 ( 2014 )  315 – 323 
• The unknown future, a future we cannot be aware of 
• The complex structural reality of modern society 
 
These two factors boost structures with strong self-generating processes, and in this case, these structures are 
finance and politics. Thus, new statuses are created, emerging themselves and subject to the laws of a normal 
social evolution, and the birth of structures which change forms and affect social allocations, because they deviate 
from norms and structural establishments of social systems. This signals the beginning of an instant, uncontrollable 
crisis, where the society’s and state’s foundations are shocked and changes occur in rapid speed.  
Hazard is a special form of future allocation, since decisions must be made about the future, based on the 
difference between probable and improbable. The hypothesis that hazard refers to the future and depends on 
correct or wrong decisions made in the present is used. Decisions guarantying order or inevitability assume 
different forms, given that the crisis complexity offers opposite visual aspects and different observers. Promises – 
decisions to deal with crisis are always predictions, either using the law of cause and effect or dialectically, via 
planning and development, trusting in progress or using specific revolutionary or transforming directions. Each 
commitment in time has social cost. The future depends on what is decided now. Thus, the future is indefinable, 
not only because it depends on several known and unknown factors on what is going to happen, but rather because 
it is cyclically related to the decision making process (Luhmann, Niklas 1991), as shown in figure 1. Applying this 
knowledge on today’s crisis, we understand that the financial liberties decided in the past, had consequences 
burdening in the future the European Union member-states.  
4.  Society and Crisis  
 In this point we shall refer to a social differentiation related to the significance of decision making in crisis. 
Luhmann makes a very important distinction between decision makers and parties affected by these decisions. 
Decision makers, the financial and political elite, may search for options of improvement or rationalization. The 
parties affected by decisions may ponder or discourse on crisis. The risks carried by decision makers may turn into 
hazards for parties found on the other side. Affected parties find themselves in hazard, due to decisions not made 
by them and decisions they cannot control. Fear, distress and the shocking experience are further enhanced, given 
that the other side does not function as a whole in the framework of social planning, but presents a structural 
disharmony and inequality in society itself.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Model of the modern society of risks  
The risk – hazard (figure 2) syndrome continues to attract the attention of today’s society, making all decisions 
seem risky, all the more so when they are verbally supported by the political and financial category of rhetorics and 
hazard. In other words: The management provided by decision makers, includes uncontrollable management of 
uncertainty and insecurity, not precautionary management.  
The importance of a decision and mostly the decision maker in times of crisis is also stressed by Carl Schmitt, 
who, focusing on cases of threats of war, describes crisis as “an emergency” in which decision makers are 
“dominant”. (Schmitt, Carl 2009) In the European crisis, the dominant can break through national disputes and 
conflicts of the past and manage crisis in a democratic cooperation or legalize the assumingly required measures in 
an authoritarian manner.  
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4.1. Politics in Crisis 
 
4.1.1. Politics as a System 
 
The affected parties are a shapeless mass, which means that they cannot be defined or organized, but they can 
be represented. The result is a form of communication making extensive use of power. Power and the political 
system in general, require and allow hazardous decisions, supported by the concept of responsibility. Hazard 
becomes a tool to assume power, a community of responsibility. The political system cannot act as it is not a 
collective actor-player. Of course we can describe the political system as a group of actions, but that means that it 
is constituted of actions – it cannot act as a unified entity. (Luhmann, Niklas 1991) For Luhmann, politics are first 
and foremost communication, a current and constantly changing composition of information, awareness and 
understanding. As part of the “simultaneous” character of all different views and remarks, a sequence of decisions 
is entered, established via the temporal structures of the political system. The political system functions in different 
time frames in comparison to the social system and its context This means that politics is exposed to a constant 
confusion brought on by the context and requires power to understand the social surroundings and react to them. 
This is the reason why politics functions in episodes, in small, unrelated stories, at the end of which lies a 
collective, binding decision, a symbolic gesture. (Luhmann, Niklas 1991) Thus, the political system is free to turn 
to new issues and expect reactions from old issues.    
Politics is presented as a social guidance system. This can lead to either action or idleness. The dual option of 
acting or non-acting corresponds to the temporal dependence of political decisions, the requirement of favorable 
moments of time (era) with the risk of acting or reacting too early or too late. This is where the rationality of 
politics and political decisions is based. Political rationality is a form of dependence on time and opportunity. 
When the above two aspects are suitable or presented as such, one can support its willingness to not decide (at least 
temporarily).  
 
4.2. Politics in the European Crisis  
  
Should we want to examine how politics behaves as a system in the society of the current crisis, we would find 
that it is not a power form of politics, applying the rules of its society, but a politics changing the rules, a politics of 
formation as Ulrich Beck suggests. We often find ourselves before several questions, situations that cannot be 
understood or dealt with suitably by today’s institutions, concepts and perceptions on politics. (Beck, Ulrich 2012) 
And even more so: Politics has the ability to transfer the formidable weight of decisions and risks to other systems, 
mostly the system of finance. This is the result of a reactive retreat strategy, leaving all decisions open and thus 
with unlimited development, ant not a product of weakness as several would suggest. This is the basic feature of 
crisis. According to Reinhart, crisis is an open-ended status, in which the decision that needs to be made has not 
been made yet. (Schmitt, Carl 2009) The regular postponement of any action, idleness widens the gap between 
decision makers in the framework of the Eurozone and parties waiting for the decisions and the fulfillment of 
institutional changes. This difference between expectations and their non-fulfillment leads to actions by the 
socially affected parties against the idle and indifferent political system.  
5.  Finance and Crisis  
5.1. The Concept of Risk in the Financial System 
  
Financial risks are risks related to temporal differences with regard to the use of money, thus risks of loans and 
investments. In particular, we refer to financial risks when expected payments (from sales, rentals, loans etc.) are 
not completed. Thus, the financial risk issue is a strictly financial – monetary problem. Money allows finance to 
become an immense area of risk transfer. The financial system’s risk regard the society citizens’ inability to pay, 
given that the prospects of money acquisition have proven wrong. This leads to the retirement of participants from 
the financial system and finance reacting with deflation On the other hand, those receiving money have greater 
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demands, require higher prices or are not willing to offer promises. In this case, we have inflation. The economy 
defends itself via increasing prices, to create willingness to withdraw money. Inflations and deflations are the 
economy’s immune system reactions, used by the system to react in a dangerous and high-risk aggravation. This 
financial self-strengthening outcome however weakens citizens – payers. 
 
5.2. The Banks’ Role  
  
Banks have a central position in the financial system. The banks’ operation is a smaller scale depiction of the 
financial system. Banks constantly supply economy with the ability of performing payments. They provide this 
ability even when ventures and households do not have the required means or when they prefer not to liquidate the 
invested money. When inflation becomes a primary issue of politics and financial markets are created worldwide, 
banks assume the operation of payment production and allocation. Even the state’s debts are served with the supply 
of money by the banks. This is also evident in the problematic relation of political decisions towards central banks. 
A central bank, being an issuing bank, cannot be insolvent. It must care for the international standing of its own 
currency and the refinancing options in international financial markets. This requires observation of the entire 
financial system. All financial political interventions are risky, given that they cannot be certain in such a complex 
framework, but only short-term and rapid.   
There is no certainty for banks – only risk negotiation, serving the best management of uncertainty. Bank 
processes do not aim to transcend risk and reach certainty, but mitigate risks to other bodies. In modern times, new 
methods have been developed in financial markets, creating risky financing, changes in product prices, share 
courses, interest rates and trade, with options and forms of risk allocation. This helps achieve risk decentralization. 
However, in crisis we also observe a method aiming to decentralize risks and regularly simplify the complexity of 
the financial status. As Ulrich Beck remarks, economists apply the method of personalization and sentimentalism 
to describe the situation of financial markets, borrowing elements from the psychological therapeutics terminology. 
(Beck, Ulrich 1993) 
6. Crisis and Democracy  
6.1. The Logic of Hazard  
 
In the complex developments occurring, man’s freedom and protection are distorted to a degree where 
sociologists consider the redefinition of Constitutional Law as perhaps the only effective solution of the issue of 
crisis, mostly based on the view that the crisis experienced is not financial, but a man – citizen crisis. “Let us not 
forsake society!” is what the sociologists suggest. The financial and Euro crisis are not the causes, but an 
aggravating factor, the symptoms of the peoples’ existential crisis. This crisis is based on the concept of hazard, 
that is, the concept of possibility. (Beck, Ulrich 1993) The concept of destruction has been established as 
permanent and thus not only violently defines daily life, but also oppresses democratic positions and leads to 
ignorance and disorientation. The concept of hazard is based on these feelings of lack of knowledge and 
disorientation. Wolfgang Münchau cleverly suggests that the financial viewpoint is blind and causes social and 
political blindness; financial science discussions are based on a political and social “illiteracy”. (Schmitt, Carl 
2009) This illiteracy governs the plethoric rhetorics of hazard for a possible destruction and collapse of fragile 
ethnocratic classes. Thus, the logic of hazard appears to the affected parties as the contrary of the logic of 
democracy.  
 
6.2. Hazard in Politics  
   
The Euro hazard logic shapes a new independent legalization of a political action, aiming to the political 
transformation of the ethnocratic class of society and politics. (Beck, Ulrich 2012) In particular, the rhetorics of a 
threatened destruction – in this case, whether Euro and Europe shall collapse – distort reality and presents current 
policy as an emergency policy to avert hazard, which is thus legalized. According to sociologists, imperialistic 
320   Anastasia J. Chournazidis /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  148 ( 2014 )  315 – 323 
tendencies can be discerned in this legalization. Policies based on risk aversion automatically prevent the options 
of unity and a common aim. A characteristic abstract of Carl Schmitt’s suggests: “The ‘humankind’ is a 
particularly useful ideological tool of imperialistic expansionism, and in its moral – humanistic form, a specific 
vehicle of financial imperialism. Proudhon’s quote, with obvious amendments, is quite relevant: Those using the 
term “humankind” aim to deceit.” (Schmitt, Carl 2009) 
The politics of hazard creates opponents, not partners, and generate and nurture the “us and them” dispute, 
separating Europe in creditor and debtor countries, an abstract and technocratic Europe, the Brussels Europe, an 
ethnocratic Europe – in other words, a political level Europe and a financial level Europe. On the other hand, the 
politics of hazard constitute the existence of a sovereign necessary, that is, the concentration of power to a single 
individual (uomo virtuoso), utilizing crisis as a favorable historical opportunity (occasione). This is a parallel to 
Niccolo Machiavelli’s theory and the political actions of Germany Chancellor Angela Merkel, developed by Ulrich 
Beck (2012). The third and definitive characteristic of the hazard politics is aimed incoherence. This incoherence 
governs the power relations among Europe member-states, the existence and convenience of European institutions 
etc. There is a constant mobility (perpertuum mobile) in actions, decisions and discussions on crisis, but no 
essential and decisive resolution of the issue. The anti-political tactics of indecisiveness balancing between the 
refusal and supposed calling for help characterize the European political scene and are tactics of control in the form 
of an aggressive invasion, also assuming the forms of extortion and intimidation via the route of hazard. (Beck, 
Ulrich 2012) 
The sovereign model (figure 3) of politics on the European crisis is the vertical relation of member-states. This 
relation is marked by a hierarchical order where a country plays the role of a single responsible party, enforcing 
strict controls and transformation requirements on an ethnocratic level, which others must follow; otherwise they 
shall be forced to leave. Equal participation is thus prevented, applying executive, anti-democratic federalism. 
(Habermas, Jürgen 2011) Equal participation in the European society, applying democratic values (figure 4) should 
be governed by trust, fair treatment, and balance between financially strong and weaker states, thus strengthening 
solidarity among the various states’ citizens. Two options and two different models of coalition emerge for the 
European Union:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Sovereign confederation  
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Fig. 4: Democratic confederation  
7. The European Crisis as a Crisis of Men  
7.1. Human Rights 
 
Ulrich Beck suggests a new social contract, similar to the one demanded by Rousseau, in the framework of 
which people shall be able to exceed their natural condition and reach a social contract for freedom within the 
community and its identity. This is the moment when people should exceed their national condition and reach a 
social contract. The “European society” cannot be understood as anything other than a “post-national society of 
national societies”, protecting the freedom of men and promoting cultural wealth. (Beck, Ulrich 2012) It is 
imperative to acquire a cosmopolitan view, deriving from understanding the various financial and non-financial 
attitudes. The European unification should be placed on a long-term prospect of justification and enculturation of 
state power. (Habermas, Jürgen 2011) This requires the institutional introduction of human rights in the politically 
configured European community. It is worth citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 22: 
“Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national 
effort and international co-operation and accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the 
economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.” 
 
7.2. Human Dignity 
  
Human rights of freedom (freedom of movement, free market movement etc.) along with the rights of 
democratic participation in the social and political planes, are the foundation of every society. This is where the 
moral and legal side of the universal acceptance of human rights converge, via the concept of human dignity. 
While the moral side defines the self-determined relation of an individual towards others, the legal side defines 
social reactions to other individuals’ claims. The concept of human dignity transfers the morality content to the 
citizens’ status class (figure 5) and this is confirmed in the framework of a constitutional state based on 
fundamental law. (Habermas, Jürgen 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: Establishment of human rights 
dignity 
322   Anastasia J. Chournazidis /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  148 ( 2014 )  315 – 323 
The conceptual importance of human dignity bridges the distance between morality and law and documents the 
indivisible character of human rights. Whilst the institutionalization of human rights is implemented with the 
existence of international courts (European Court of Human Rights, courts for crimes of war, Hague International 
Court), politics abuses this legalization of human rights. The disengagement of human rights from their moral 
status and thus the indirect, uncertain encroachment of human dignity is a political strategy with imperialistic aims. 
This is evident in the gradual limitation of the national states’ field of action, which in turn oppress the political 
and social rights of their citizens. Kenneth Baynes characteristically suggests the distinction occurring today 
between inherent human rights acquired due to human nature itself and human rights introducing men to a political 
community named “political conception”. (Baynes, Kenneth 2009) This political conception thus is constituted by 
an oppression of human rights and tactics aiming to conceal the lack of long-term viewpoints for an organized 
international society in a minimalistic rhetoric shrinking the causes of crisis in a short-sighted financial viewpoint, 
as ordered by major banks and evaluation firms. Today, the financial system orders the refusal of state loaning and 
the promotion of austerity, that is, increase of taxes, reduction of state expenses, negotiations with creditors and 
inflationary politics. This executive dependence of politics on the commercial financial system is opposed to the 
autopoietic operation of a society’s systems, as described by Luhmann, where each system has its own independent 
codes of operation, in a common society development and evolution. 
8.  Conclusion  
Politics acquire a legal character via law, where the Constitution is also established. The democratic justification 
of political power is based on this, as well as its co-existence with society'’ other operating systems. This is where 
the European Union’s weakness can be found. The member-states’ law is inferior to Europe’s law, and again we 
find the vertical relation between Europe and its member-states, where the dominant party re-defines its 
competencies, expanding its limited political field according to international law. Europe's Constitution focuses on 
and gives priority to Europe’s future citizens and a constantly increasing unification of the people of Europe: 
“Reflecting the will of the citizens and States of Europe to build a common future, this Constitution establishes the 
European Union, on which the Member States confer competences to attain objectives they have in common. The 
Union shall coordinate the policies by which the Member States aim to achieve these objectives, and shall exercise 
on a Community basis the competences they confer on it”.   
According to this, the citizens of Europe and citizens of a state should equally and equivalently be able to form 
opinions and make political decisions (Habermas, Jürgen 2011), in a federational entity ensuring freedom and 
democracy in their own state. In other words, that their state’s participation is a guarantee safeguarding their law, 
dignity and equality with regard to living conditions and the social occasions of life. This expands European Union 
from a locally acting to a cosmopolitan community of Europe’s citizens, where human rights are primarily a 
political act, not a political rhetoric. This builds a European consciousness for citizens, as arranged via the 
consideration of communicative networks and perceptional viewpoints, which shall be able to replace the crisis 
consciousness, which no-one can be certain on how long it shall last and where it shall lead, and which is tending 
to become a structure of today’s society. Citizens’ European consciousness, the idea that they are members of a 
state and members of Europe, should create “corrective” areas of thinking and action, not in the framework of a 
blindly developing internationalization, but in the framework of a constitutional enculturation of the relations 
between state and society (Habermas, Jürgen 2011), with substantial participation of citizens. 
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